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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h),
Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact that would preclude the enforcement of the artificial insemination contract
requiring the Appellant be legally responsible for any child born as a result of the
application of the artificial insemination procedure on the Appellee when the Appellant is
not the biological father of the child.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Furthermore, since summary judgment is a question of law, the appellate court is
free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. K & T, Inc. v. Doroulis, 888 P.2d 623,
626-27 (Utah 1994).
ISSUE: Did the Trial Court err in not applying the doctrines of estoppel, res judicata,
and waiver.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Furthermore, since summary judgment is a question of law, the appellate court is
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free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. K & T, Inc. v. Doroulis. 888 P.2d 623,
626-27 (Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on the 31st day of March, 1979. The Appellee gave birth
to two children, Stephanie Krambule, born on January 20, 1985 and Matthew Krambule,
born on March 24, 1992. The parties entered into a stipulation and property settlement
agreement on the 16th day of January, 1992. The Appellant appeared in court on the 10th day
of February, 1992 and presented testimony concerning jurisdiction and grounds and
introduced the stipulation and agreement. The divorce decree was signed by the judge on
the 3rd day of April, 1992 and entered with the clerk of the court on the 6th day of April,
1992. The Appellee filed a verified petition on July 15, 1996 in which the Appellee
requested the court to make a determination as to the Appellant' s responsibility for the minor
child Matthew Krambule.
The trial court invited the parties to submit motions for summary judgment on the
paternity issue. The motions were heard on the 21 st day of January, 1998 and the judge
issued a bench ruling. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order on motion for
summary judgment were signed by the judge on March 24, 1998 and filed with the clerk of
the court on March 27, 1998. An evidentiary hearing was concerning the financial aspects
of the court's ruling was held on the 30th day of April, 1998. This hearing resulted in
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a modified divorce decree, which were entered with
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the clerk of the court on the 9th day of July, 1998. The Appellant filed an appeal to this court
on or about the 8th day of September, 1998.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on March 31, 1979. The parties had two children,
Stephanie, bom January 29,1985, and Matthew, bom March 24,1992. Both children were
conceived through artificial insemination. The facts surrounding the second child are at
issue in this case. The parties have separated twice since their marriage. Once in late 1989
and again on or about May 2, 1991. (Deposition of Barbra R. Krambule, hereinafter
Krambule depo., pp. 9-11). On or about July 18, 1990, the parties agreed to again use
artificial insemination to conceive a child. On that date the parties signed an agreement
entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial
Insemination of Donor Sperm". (Krambule depo., pp. 12-13). A copy of the Agreement is
attached as Addendum 1. Beginning in August, 1990, and continuing thereafter until
January 1991, Appellant underwent various medical procedures to prepare for the artificial
insemination process which included two surgical procedures and the administration of
medication preventing her menstrual periods. In approximately February, 1991, Appellant
and Appellee picked three potential sperm donors. (Krambule depo., pp. 14-15). Beginning
in February, 1991, and &continuing thereafter until Appellee conceived, she began
undergoing blood tests, taking fertility drugs, having ultrasounds and undergoing the
insemination process. (Krambule depo., pp. 17-18).
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The parties separated on approximately May 2, 1991 and Appellee conceived on or
about June 23,1991, approximately one month after the parties separated. (Krambule depo.,
pp. 18). During the month after separation the Appellee continued with the process because
she believed that they would work things out as they had before in the previous separation.
(Krambule depo., p21). In fact, during the Summer of 1991, the parties continued seeing
each other socially. (Krambule depo., p47). After separating, Appellant wrote a letter to the
Appellee which she received at the end of May, 1991 in an attempt to reconcile with the
Appellee. (Krambule depo. p40-41). A copy of this letter and its typewritten equivalent was
included as Deposition Exhibit 3 to the Appellee's deposition and is attached hereto as
Addendum 2. After discussing the financial ramifications of divorce, the second to last
paragraph of that letter states "And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how that's going to
work." This letter admits that the Appellant knew Barbra Krambule was continuing the
artificial insemination procedure and could still get pregnant. (Krambule depo., p43).
Three months after conception, in approximately September, 1991, the Appellee then
initiated divorce proceedings.
Appellant's

In approximately November or December 1991, the

counsel prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement.

On

December 3, 1991, Appellee's attorney sent a letter to Appellant's attorney stating that the
Appellee wished to pursue child support for the child with which she was pregnant. This
letter is identified as Deposition Exhibit 2 to the Appellee's deposition and a copy is
attached hereto as Addendum 3.
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Prior to the preparation and execution of the stipulation and agreement, the Appellee
was admitted to St. Benedict's Hospital for emotional and mental problems resulting from
verbal abuse and other conflicts arising between the parties during the marriage and was
hospitalized for three weeks. (Krambule depo. p24). When Appellee signed the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement, she was still undergoing treatment at St. Benedict's.
(Krambule depo., pp. 25-26).
Matthew was born on March 24,1992, and the Divorce Decree was entered on April
6, 1992. Appellee did not pursue paternity after Matthew was bom because the Appellant
always promised to do what was right for Matthew in the future. (Krambule depo., p30).
The Appellant continually led the Appellee to believe that he would assume responsibility
for Matthew by telling the other minor child that he would start visiting with her and her
brother when Matthew got older. (Krambule depo. p.28). Then he wanted to wait until a
child psychologist determined what was best for Matthew. (Krambule depo. p28). When
Appellee realized that the Appellant was never going to accept responsibility for Matthew,
she initiated this proceeding. (Krambule depo., p30).
At the request of the trial court, both parties submitted motions for summary
judgment. The Appellee's motion was supported by the Appellee's deposition, which was
published. The Appellant's motion was not supported by a deposition or by Affidavit. On
January 21, 1998 a hearing on the summary judgments was held before Judge Darwin
Hansen. That hearing resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a order on motion
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for summary judgment, which documents were filed with the clerk on March 27, 1998.
(Copies of said documents are attached hereto as Addendums 4 and 5). After the Court's
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing relating to the financial
obligations of the Appellant as the result of the summary judgment ruling was held before
Judge Hansen on the 30th day of April, 1998. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
modified decree of divorce was entered with the clerk of the court on July 9, 1998.
The Appellant appealed from the trial court's order on the motions for summary
judgment and from the evidentiary hearing held on April 30,1998. However, a review of
the Appellant's brief on appeal will demonstrate that all of the issues raised in Points 1
through 4 of the Appellant's brief deal with the trial court's determination that the Appellant
was the father of the child, which determination was made as result of the motions for
summary judgment. The Appellant in his brief under issues presented for review only
addresses the issue of the determination of the Appellant as the father of the minor child
Matthew and does not raise any issues concerning the financial obligations imposed upon
the Appellant at the subsequent evidentiary hearing held on April 30,1998. The Appellant,
however, attempts to use evidentiary findings made at the April 30, 1998 hearing to attack
the trial court's decision on the motions for summary judgment, which motions were heard
on January 21, 1998.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly ruled that the artificial insemination contract bound the
Appellee to be legally responsible for the minor child born as a result of this procedure
despite the fact that the parties were separated at the time of conception. The issues of intent,
contract interpretation and bad faith were not preserved for appeal and no factual basis either
by affidavit of deposition testimony was presented by the Appellant to support their
application. Even if these issues were preserved, the clear and unambiguous language ofthe
contract clearly shows that the Appellant had expressly given his consent to be bound by the
artificial insemination contract and, therefore, the District Court did not need to consider
extrinsic evidence for purposes of the partial summary judgment.

;

^

The issues of estoppel, res judicata and waiver are not preserved for appeal and no
factual basis either by Affidavit or deposition testimony was presented by the Appellee at
the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. The Appellant asserts these issues as a
defense to the court's determination that the Appellant is the father of the minor child
Matthew. Those do not preclude the trial court from determining that the Appellant was the
natural father of the minor child, and furthermore, public policy concerns regarding the
support of minor children preclude the application of legal and equitable defenses such as
estoppel, res judicata and waiver to prevent the collection of on going child support for
minor children, even those bom as a result of artificial insemination.
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Appellee was awarded attorney's fees and costs at trial. If she prevails on this appeal,
she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal as determined
on remand.
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANT FAILED TO CREATE ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
Rule 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trail.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e).
The Utah Supreme Court has found that a party may not rely upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings to avoid summary judgment, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224
(Utah 1983); Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1979).
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by her deposition
testimony and all facts cited by the Appellee were referenced to the appropriate portion of
the deposition record. Appellant failed to introduce any testimony by affidavit or otherwise
which contradicted the facts alleged by Appellee. The Appellant in his brief cites from the
findings of fact entered by the court as a result of an evidentiary hearing held on April 30,
1998. The trial court's ruling on the summary judgment was on or about the 21 st day of
-8-

January, 1998. None of the evidence available to the court on April 30,1998 was available
to the trial judge when he ruled on the summary judgment with the exception of the
deposition of the Appellee. It is inappropriate for the Appellant to rely upon factual
determinations made at a subsequent hearing as a basis for reversing a summary judgment
issued by the trial court more than three months before. If the Appellant wanted to rely upon
such information, it was the Appellant's obligation to have presented that information to the
trial court at the time of the motion for summary judgment by Affidavit or otherwise. The
Appellant failed to do so and cannot now attack the trial court's ruling on summary
judgment by reference to that material.
One of the most significant factual allegations that Appellant fails to dispute is his
knowledge that the Appellant was continuing with the artificial insemination procedure after
the parties separated in May, 1991. (Addendum 2). Appellee thought he did know because
of the letter she received at the end of May, 1991 alluding to what will happen if she gets
pregnant. Appellant attempts to create a material issue of this fact by denying his knowledge
but fails to support his denial with any reference to any affidavit or sworn testimony that was
before the trial judge when the motion was heard.
Having failed to create a material issue of fact concerning his knowledge, the
remainder of his appeal should be denied since he did have knowledge that Appellee was
continuing with the procedure and took no steps to with draw his consent.
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II.
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Appellant takes his appeal from both the District grant of partial motion for summary
judgment and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Modified Decree of Divorce
arising from the trial. Appellant has failed to identify which of his Issues Presented arise
from which of the prior proceedings. However, for those issues presented at trial, the
Appellant has the burden of marshaling the evidence. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah
App. 1994). If the facts are not marshaled, the Court "assumes that the record supports the
findings of the trial court," Id, at 12 (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah
1991).
The District Court specifically limited its determination in the summary judgment
by stating "The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment and
will rule solely in [sic] the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the
minor child in question". R. at 327. The Court went on to conclude that the Appellant was
the legal father of the child because the artificial insemination contract was still in effect at
the time the child was bom.
Subsequently, Appellant raised several defenses to a determination of his financial
responsibility as a result of the application of the contract. Among those issues raised at trial
on April 30, 1998 were estoppel, res judicata and waiver. At trial, the Court partially
accepted one of those defenses, estoppel, to preclude the Appellee from collecting any child
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support accruing prior to the date the Petition to Modify was filed. Specific findings of fact
were entered on the issue of estoppel. R. at 397-98. To the extent Appellant seeks to
reverse the Trial Court's evidentiary hearing of April 30, 1998, Appellant is required to
marshal the evidence as it relates to these issues.
The Appellant has failed in his brief to demonstrate that any evidence was presented
at the motion for summary judgment to counter the factual allegations made by the Appellee
in her deposition. Consequently, the court should dismiss the Appellant's appeal as to the
court's determination as a result of the motion for summary judgment.
III.
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT
AGREEING TO ACCEPT ALL LEGAL
AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREN
BORN AS A RESULT OF THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PROCEDURE.
On or about July 18, 1990, Rick D. Krambule and Barbara Krambule signed a
document entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial
Insemination of Donor Semen", hereinafter "Agreement", Krambule depo. Exhibit 1. A
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement states:
We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept the full
legal, moral, parental, financial, social, emotional and cultural
responsibility and care of any offspring that may result from any
pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination
procedure(s). We also mutually and individually agree to
accept and assume the same duties, obligations and
responsibilities toward such offspring to the full extent in the
same manner as owed by the undersigned to naturally occurring
offspring, and acknowledge and agree that any offspring
-11-

resulting from the artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be
their legal heir(s) and that the said offspring shall be, for all
purposes, the child of the husband and wife, and the husband
shall for all purposes be considered the father of the said
offspring.

We agree, individually and severally, that neither of them will
at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in any way, any
person, including any child or offspring in initiating or pursuing
any claim or legal proceeding with respect to any matter arising
out of, or resulting from the artificial insemination procedure(s)
authorized herein.
Agreement If 10 & 13.
Appellant has not argued that he was under duress, incompetent, uninformed, or that
there was a mistake, lack of consideration or the existence of fraud so as to call into question
the validity of the contract. Rather, Appellant attacks the subsequent application of the
contract to a child born after the separation of the parties.
A child born in wedlock is presumed to be the parent's child. This presumption
cannot be rebutted by the testimony of the parents. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 provides
that:
children born to the parties after the date of the marriage, shall
be deemed the legitimate children of both the parties for all
purposes.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2) (emphasis added).
While this presumption may be rebutted, it cannot be rebutted by the testimony of
the child's parents. This is known as the "Lord Mansfield's rule". State in Interest of
-12-

J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). In that case the Supreme Court stated "spouses
themselves may not give testimony which would tend to illegitimize the child". Id. at 71314. Furthermore, the party wishing to rebut this presumption must do so "beyond a
reasonable doubt". Id. at 713.
Therefore, the only way Appellant can disprove the paternity of this child is on the
basis that the child is not genetically related to the father. However, as discussed below,
equitable principals prevent him from using this evidence.
Due to infertility problems, Appellant and Appellee sought to implement a procedure
known as heterologous insemination or AID.

This procedure involves artificial

insemination using the sperm of a third person donor. In consultation with a doctor, the
parties agreed to sign the agreement referred to above. That agreement precludes both parties
from denying their responsibility for a child and from initiating any legal proceeding to
invalidate their parental liability for a child born from the procedure.
Equitable Estoppel has three elements: representation, reliance and detriment. This
doctrine may only be used when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise perpetrate
a fraud or unfair advantage. Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989).
In the case at bar, Appellee has relied upon the representations made by the Appellant
in the Agreement and particularly those made in paragraph 10. In reliance upon these
representations, the Appellee consented to under go this lengthy and sometimes painful
procedure in order to become pregnant. The procedure was successful, Appellee became
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pregnant and now the Appellee has the responsibilities arising by virtue of being the natural
mother to this child. Appellant should be prevented from taking advantage of the Appellee
by shirking the financial responsibility he agreed to accept under the Agreement.
IV.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE INTENT OF PARTIES IN
AGREEING TO THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION CONTRACT IS
IRRELEVANT.
(1)

The issue of intent has not been preserved for appeal.
In order for the Appellant to preserve a substantive issue for appeal, the Appellant

must first raise the issue before the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake County Com'n, 945 P.2d
125,129 (Utah App. 1997). In order for the District Court to be given an opportunity to rule
on the issue several steps must be taken. First, the issue must be timely raised. Second, the
issue must be specifically raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court. Finally
the party must introduce to the trial court supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to
support its argument. Id, at 130 (citations omitted).
In this matter, the Appellant has raised for the first time the argument that the Trial
Court failed to consider the "parties intent of [sic] the artificial insemination contract and
its interpretation" (Appellant's Brief p. 17). No mention of the intent of the parties nor the
interpretation of the artificial insemination contract was made in Appellant's Memorandum
in Support of Summary Judgment nor was the issue raised at the hearing on the Motion on
January 21,1998. In fact, as the Appellant notes "The trial court did not hear any evidence
-14-

as to the intent of the parties nor whether the contract is clear on its face." (Appellant's
Brief p. 17). The reason there was no evidence of intent taken by the Court was because it
was not raised as an issue either in the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment or at trial.
As a result, the District Court has not had an opportunity to consider or rule on the issues
of intent and interpretation now raised in Appellant's argument and those issues should not
now be considered on appeal.
(2)

Extrinsic evidence was not admissible to interpret the Artificial Insemination
Contract.
Even assuming the issues of intent and interpretation were preserved by the

Appellant, the District Court properly granted summary judgment without resorting to
extrinsic evidence. It is well settled that extrinsic evidence only becomes admissible if the
terms of the contract are unclear or ambiguous. Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises. Inc., 968 P.2d
861, 863 (Utah App. 1998). Furthermore, "when a contract is in writing and the language
is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must also be determined from the words of the
agreement and a contract interpreted without regard to extrinsic evidence is a question of
law." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1074 (Utah 1997). Thus,
if the Trial Court did not conclude that the Agreement was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence
is not admissible to interpret its meaning or the intent of the parties.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has found that ambiguity does not exist merely
because a party can ascribe a contrary meaning or intent to a particular provision of the
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contract. Rather, the opposing interpretation must be tenable. The Utah Supreme Court has
held:
a contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just because one
party gives that provision a different meaning than another party
does. To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the
parties must each be tenable.
Id (citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725
(Utah 1990).
Appellant attempts to find ambiguity in the intent of the parties by relying upon
paragraph 8 of the Agreement. (Appellant's Brief p. 18). Paragraph 8 states: "We
acknowledge that our participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is voluntary."
Appellant wishes to interpret this as requiring ongoing consent and, therefore, Appellee had
a duty to inform the Appellant that she was continuing with the procedure after their
separation. Neither the interpretation nor the conclusion drawn by Appellant therefrom are
tenable.
The only tenable reading of this language is that the signors of this document
acknowledged that by signing the document that they have granted their consent to
participate in the artificial insemination procedure. Under no possible reading of this
language can it be claimed that it creates an affirmative duty on the part of the Appellee to
obtain Mr. Krambule's consent before every test, treatment or examination. As testified to
by Appellee in her deposition, the artificial insemination process began in August, 1990,
approximately nine months before the parties separated. This process included two
-16-

surgeries, the taking of fertility drugs and a submission to a very involved process of testing
Appellee's blood every three days and then every day during the course of a menstrual cycle
to determine the best time to fertilize the eggs. This procedure went on for several months
before the Appellee became pregnant. (Krambule depo. ppl4-17).
Even if the Court were to interpret the Agreement as requiring Appellant's ongoing
consent, the Appellee must take an affirmative step to revoke his consent, which he had
previously given expressly in paragraph 8 of the Agreement. Appellant has failed to
introduce any evidence that he had withdrawn or attempted to withdraw his consent at any
time after the parties separation on May 2, 1991, and before conception in June, 1991.
(Krambule depo. 18). The Appellant did not tell the Appellee to stop the artificial
insemination procedure. (Krambule Depo, pp. 42-43). The Appellant, also after the parties
separated, received bills from the continuing artificial insemination procedure. (Krambule
depo., p. 45).
The Appellant's action was reasonable given the history of the parties, including a
previous separation and reconciliation, Appellant's desire to reconcile, the fact that no
divorce proceedings had been initiated by the time of conception in June, 1991, and the
extensive and costly procedure involved. (Krambule depo. pp. 40-41). In the May letter,
(Addendum 2), the Appellant discussed the financial problems that would occur if they did
not reconcile and Appellee did get pregnant. (Krambule depo. p43). The Appellant
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interpreted this to mean that the Appellee did know that she was continuing with the
procedure. (Krambule depo. p43).
Aside for the bare assertions in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion and those
made in the Brief in support of this Appeal, the Appellant offered no evidence at the time
of the motion for summary judgment countering the Appellant's version of events or
interpretation of them as set forth in the Appellant's deposition and cited in the
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Under Utah law, when a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment
and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials, the trial court may
properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Franklin Fin, v. New
Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf. Co.. 695
P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah
1987). Therefore, even if the issue of intent had been raised before the Trial Court and the
contract interpreted as requiring the ongoing consent of the Appellant, the undisputed facts
allowed the Trial Court to conclude that the Appellant knew ofthe continuing procedure and
that Appellant's consent had not been withdrawn before conception.
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V.
APPELLEE DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH.
A.

THE ISSUE OF BAD FAITH HAS NOT BEEN PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
As with the issues of intent and contract interpretation, the Appellant failed to raise

this issue in his Motion for Summary Judgment. As set forth above, the District Court has
not had the opportunity to rule on the issue as is required to preserve an issue for appeal.
Therefore, Appellant's argument on this issue of good faith should not be considered.
B.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF BAD FAITH.
Even if the Appellant had preserved this issue for appeal, Appellant has failed to

introduce any evidence that Appellant has not acted in good faith. In the State of Utah a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships.
St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991).
Appellant argues that the Appellee has breached this covenant by "withholding
knowledge of her continued attempts to become pregnant," thereby depriving him of his
voluntary participation in the pregnancy. (Appellant's Brief p21). As discussed above in
paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Appellant has granted express consent and there is no
explicit contractual basis for requiring his ongoing consent to be obtained by the Appellee.
Appellant now attempts to create that duty by arguing that the covenant of good faith
imposes it. As discussed in Part III, the undisputed facts show that at the time the Appellee
was continuing the artificial insemination process after the parties had separated, she
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believed that Appellant knew that she was continuing with the procedure and that her
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Although Appellant claims to the contrary
in both his Appellant's Brief and Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment, he has not cited any affidavit or deposition testimony supporting that
claim. Absent testimony to the contrary, Appellant cannot rely upon mere allegations of
ignorance to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Even ifAppellant had submitted contradictory testimony or even undisputed evidence
that he lacked any knowledge about the continued treatments, that fact alone would not
create a genuine issue of material fact concerning Appellee's alleged breach of the covenant
of good faith. The Utah Supreme Court in St. Benedict's explained what that covenant of
good faith requires. They held:
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party
impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do
anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to
receive the fruits of the contract, [citations omitted]
A violation of the covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of
contract.
Id at 199).
The propriety of claiming a breach of contract as an affirmative defense to a paternity
action is not clear. Nevertheless, Appellant's argument does not allege that Appellee has
prevented him from enjoying the fruits of the contract. The fruit of this contract is not
Appellant's consent, it is the successful pregnancy and birth of a child. Therefore, by
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continuing with the treatment, Appellee took the steps necessary to permit the parties to
receive the ultimate object of the Contract.
VI.
THE APPELLEE DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY CONDUCT
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA OR WAIVER.
The Appellant has attached a copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
divorce decree entered into between the parties in February, 1992 as Addenda 8 and 9 to the
Appellant's brief. Those documents do not discuss the parties' minor child Matthew
Krambule. It is clear that the Appellant knew that a child had been born to the Appellee by
reason of the artificial insemination prior to the entry of the divorce decree. However, the
Appellant's attorney, Robert F. Neeley, in drafting the documents made no reference to that
child and did not include a finding that Matthew was not the child of the Appellant. The
Appellant attempts to establish this by attaching to his brief as Addendum 7, a minute entry
from a default hearing. The last sentence in the second paragraph of that minute entry states,
"There is a child expected by the Defendant, but the child is not the Plaintiffs". As
indicated in the minute entry, this was a default hearing and neither the Appellee nor her
attorney were present on that occasion. If the court made such a conclusion, it had to be
based upon the representations of the Appellant since that information was not contained in
the stipulation, which the court ordered to be incorporated into the findings, conclusions and
divorce decree. The hearing on February 10,1992 was not a default divorce as stated in the
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minute entry. Rather, the divorce was entered based upon the stipulation of the parties and
not upon the default of the Appellee. Consequently, the trial court had no authority to enter
any findings of fact that were inconsistent with the stipulation that had been agreed upon by
the parties. This is evident from the fact that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
divorce decree do not contain the language stating that the Appellant was not the father of
the child Matthew. The stipulation and property settlement agreement is attached as
Addendum 6 to the Appellee's brief. Paragraph 1 of the stipulation states, "That Plaintiff
may have his hearing to obtain a mutual divorce in said action at any time without further
notice to the Defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this stipulation and
agreement." The Appellee did not agree to withdraw her answer and to allow a default to
be entered in this case. Instead, the parties agreed that a divorce could be granted based
upon the terms and conditions of the stipulation. The stipulation makes no reference to the
child Matthew. In addition, the stipulation does not state that one child has been born to the
parties. That language was place in the findings by the Appellant's attorney. However, it
was not justified since the language of the stipulation contains no such statement.
At the time of the motion for summary judgment, the Appellant did not claim that the
statement in the minute entry by Judge Allphin constituted an estoppel, res judicata or
waiver. The court should not now consider those arguments in reviewing the trial court's
summary judgment ruling.
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VII.
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS PRECLUDE ANY ACT
BY THE PARTIES TO DEFEAT THE MINOR CHILD'S RIGHT OF
PATERNITY AND TO SUPPORT.
Strong public policy expressions of concern for the paternity and the support of minor
children have long been a part of Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court emphasized this
public policy issue in Gullev v. Gullev. 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). In Gullev, the father
agreed to pay and the wife agreed to accept $ 10,000 as prepayment for all obligations under
the Divorce Decree. The State of Utah then sought to collect child support from the father
irrespective of the agreement. In ruling for the State, the Court succinctly stated:
Every parent has the duty to support the children he has brought
into the world. This duty is inalienable and he cannot rid
himself of it by purporting to transfer it to someone else, by
contract or otherwise. Moreover, the minor children who are
the beneficiaries of this duty were not parties to the agreement
and they could not be bound thereby.
Gullev v. Gullev, 570 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has directly addressed the doctrine of estoppel in the
context of child support in Department of Human Services v. Irizarry, 943 P.2d 676 (Utah
1997). The Irizarrv Court upheld the application of estoppel to prevent a parent from
seeking reimbursement but explicitly rejected its application to ongoing child support. The
reason for this distinction rested primarily upon the policy considerations regarding the need
of children to support from two parents and the fact that ongoing child support belongs to
the minor child, not the parent. The Court held:
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We begin by noting that no statement of rejection on Parker's
part, no matter how strong, could have legally defeated the
children's right to support. Utah's child support laws and the
guidelines that accompany them are designed to maximize
support to children from both of their parents, [citations
omitted] We emphasized in Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517
(Utah 1981), that the right of the minor children to support
cannot be 'bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in anyway
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties' [citation
omitted].
Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
The Court went on to explain that reimbursement is distinct from ongoing child
support since ongoing child support must be available to supply current needs while
reimbursement cannot alter the level of support already received by the child. The Court
recognized that there is no legal requirement for those payments subsequently made by the
parent to go to the child. Id. at 680.
Appellant gives no basis for overruling Irizarry and applying the doctrine of estoppel
beyond the date he was given notice of the Petition except by attempting to seperate the
issues of the determination of paternity from the obligations of a parent. By arguing that
Appellee should be equitably estopped from pursuing this claim of paternity, Appellee
argues for a result that will have the same effect on the minor child, namely, no support from
one of the parents of the child. This permits the Appellant to attempt to apply the doctrines
of estoppel, res judicata and waiver to prevent the application of the support clause in the
artificial insemination contract. As will be discussed below, each of these doctrines is not
applicable to defeat his obligations for the minor child.
-24-

A.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
At trial, the District Court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did apply

to exclude any amounts of past due child support or reimbursement for all periods prior to
the month following the filing of the present Petition. (R. at 406-7). The District Court's
ruling on this issue can be found in the Conclusions of Law which state:
The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible for
paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statue
limits the period to four (4) years prior to the determination of
paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past
child support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if
applicable. In this matter, the Court finds that Respondent's
conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce
proceedings, is sufficient to disallow payment for back child
support beyond the date she filed for a determination of
Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable
Estoppel.
Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 3(b).
Factually, the Appellant has failed to supply any evidence to support equitable
estoppel. Irrespective of the lack of evidence, as a legal matter, this Court should uphold the
policy considerations discussed above and refuse to apply this doctrine to defeat the minor
child's right to ongoing child support.
These policy considerations should also apply to the determination of paternity. Acts
of a parent should not defeat a child's right to two parents.
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B.

RES JUDICATA
Based upon that same analysis and policy considerations, res judicata should not act

to defeat the obligations of a parent to their child. Appellant argues that since Matthew's
paternity was not litigated in the initial divorce proceeding, this present attempt at
establishing paternity should be barred by claim preclusion. Claim preclusion is a branch
of res judicata and requires that all the claims of the parties that could have and should have
been litigated in a prior action are barred in any subsequent actions. Estate of Covington v.
Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1994).
The very language quoted in Irizarry forecloses the use of any legal or equitable
doctrine from defeating a claim for ongoing child support.

The Court in Irizarry

affirmatively quoted the Court in Hills v. Hills. 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981). The Hills
Court stated: "the right of the minor children to support cannot be "bartered away,
extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties".
The literal application of this language would bar the application of res judicata, as well
estoppel, since both are based upon the conduct or agreement of the parties.
Even ifthe Court were to apply res judicata, Appellant has failed to meet its elements.
There are two branches in res judicata, claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. Dept. of
Social Services v. Ruscetta. 742 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1987). Collateral estoppel is not
applicable because it only bars issues raised in subsequent litigation that were decided in the
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first. Id at 116. However, to be applied, the issue in question must be "fully and fairly
litigated" in the prior litigation. Id.
The parentage of Matthew Krambule was never even raised let alone litigated in the
stipulated divorce. As discussed above, the minute entry falsely identified the proceeding
as a default judgment and the testimony of the Appellant did not correspond to the
agreements in the Stipulation.
The other branch of res judicata, collateral estoppel, operates to bar a second claim
between the same party or their privies concerning the same claim or cause of action which
were actually litigated or should have been litigated in the prior action. IdL_ As with issue
preclusion, there was no litigation or determination of Matthew's parentage in the initial
divorce proceedings. Nor could it have been brought. Absent the consent of the father, the
time for a trial shall not be held before the birth of the child. § 78-45a-6, Utah Code
Annotated. At the time the Stipulation was signed and the hearing on the divorce held,
Matthew had not yet been born and no consent had been obtained to proceed. Matthew was
born on March 24, 1992, nearly three months after stipulation was signed and the divorce
was heard.
CL

WAIVER.
As discussed above, Irizarry preludes the use of any legal or equitable doctrine to

prevent the collection of ongoing child support since it would permit the actions of one of
the parties to preclude the collection of ongoing child support from a party otherwise legally
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responsible for the child. On the same basis, waiver should be used to preclude the
operation of this contract to defeat the Appellant's obligations for the minor child.
The Utah Supreme Court in Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990) rejected
the application of contractual theories to defeat an increase in child support. In Gates, the
appellant filed an appeal of a modified divorce decree increasing his child support to reflect
his most recent pay raise. Over two years earlier, the parties had stipulated to increase child
support gradually based upon a modest estimates of the father's earnings growth in the
future. When the custodial parent learned of the actual income of the father, she filed a
petition to modify the divorce decree while the Appellant sought to enforce the stipulation.
The Court rejected the stipulation and held:
In Meyers, this court noted that while contract theories such as
bargain and waiver are properly applied to a stipulation as to
property distribution, such theories are inapplicable to issues
which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court,
such as child custody and support.
IdLatl346.
Just as in Gates, the Appellant seeks to apply the contract theory of waiver to the
issue of his obligations. This Court should reject its application on the basis that it cannot
trump the equitable powers of the court in determining paternity and in setting and enforcing
child support obligations.
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VIII.
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL.
At trial the District Court awarded $5,803.13 to Appellee for attorney's fees and
costs. Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce are awarded below to the party who then prevails
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489,494
(Utah App. 1991) citing Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990). Therefore,
if Appellee prevails in this appeal, she should be awarded attorney's fees and costs as
determined by the District Court on remand.
CONCLUSION
The issues of intent, contract interpretation and bad faith were not preserved for
appeal and should not be considered. Furthermore, public policy concerns regarding the
support of minor children preclude the application of estoppel, res judicata and waiver. The
District Court correctly ruled that the artificial insemination contract bound the Appellee to
be legally responsible for the minor child born as a result of this procedure despite the fact
that the parties were separated at the time of conception. Finally, if Appellee prevails on this
appeal, she should be awarded her attorney's fees as determined on remand.
The trial court's order on the parties Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and its
subsequent modification of the Decree of Divorce should be upheld and
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the issue of attorney's fees and costs on appeal be remanded to the District Court.
DATED this £%_ day of May, 1999.

ROBERT A ECHARD
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee to Robert L. Neeley, attorney for Appellant Ricky D. Krambule at 2485 Grant Ave,
Suite 200, Ogden, Utah, 84401.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Appellee
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
AND
DIVISION OF UROLOGY
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN

1.
W e , as husband and wife, acknowledge that we have been
unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the
following
conditions?
notwithstanding
thorough
evaluation and
therapy:
(A)

Abnormality of the semen, including reduced
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm;

<B)

Cervical disease, including immobilization
sperm;

(C)

Endometriosis;

(D)

Other causes including unexplained

<E)

Or have genetic problems.

of the

infertility;

2.
Ule hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in an
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained from
an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s).
(A)

In order to facilitate
the success
of this
procedure, we agree to follow procedures and
complete
documentation
as
outlined
by the
Department of Obstetrics and/or the Division of
Urology of the University
of Utah School of
Medicine.

3.
Ule are aware, on the basis of present information, the
chances that a pregnancy will be achieved
by the artificial
insemination
procedure(s) are ^0-7S%
through
six cycles, and
acknowledge that no representations or guarantees, express or
implied, have
been made to us with
respect
to whether the
procedure(s) will be successful.
**.
Ule have been fully
informed of all known significant
and substantial
risks incident
to artificial
insemination,
whether fresh or frozen semen is used, which include:
1

(A)

Bleeding and/or

infection;

(B)

Pain associated with the various procedures;

(C)

Discomfort
and
complictions
connected
pregnancyj childbirth and delivery;.

(D)

Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind,
including
but not
limited
to
infection(s) or
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen;

(E)

Uncertainty of
genetic, hereditary
tendencies of such offspring;

(F)

Other adverse consequences of any kind*
which are
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or
indirectly to the artificial
insemination and/or
procedure(s).

traits

with

or

5.
We acknowledge
that if pregnancy is achieved there is
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic
contribution from
the donor's sperm, and that in any event, all
pregnancies face a 3-*f% risk of some birth defect.
6.
We have been offered the option of carrier
testing or
chromosome
testing of the donor
if there
is a history of
autosomal
recessive
trait
or
a
heritable
chromosomal
translocation in the wife.
7.
We have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions
about the procedure(s) and the risks involved, and our questions
have been fully answered to our satisfaction.
S.
We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial
insemination procedure(s) is voluntary.
9.
In order to artificially
inseminate
the wife, the
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not
at any time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the
success or failure of the insemination.
The undersigned, and
each of them, agree that the identity of the donor shall not be
divulged
to
them or
any
offspring
resulting
from such
insemination
for any reason by the doctor, except upon the
issuance of
a duly authorized
order of court of competent
jurisdiction, the issuance of which shall
not be sought by the
undersigned.
The doctor shall
require
the donor
to agree in
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned.

2

10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept
the full legal, moral, parental, financial, social, emotional and
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result
from any pregnancy achieved
through the artificial insemination
procedure(s).
We also mutually and individually agree to accept
and assume
the same duties, obligations
and responsibilities
toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as
owed by the undersigned
to naturally
occurring offspring, and
acknowledge
and agree that any offspring
resulting from the
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s)
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child
of the husband and wife, and the husband
shall for all purposes
be considered the father of the said offspring.
11. The doctor
in consultation
with husband
and wife may
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors,
to select
the donor(s), including
the
laboratory which has
collected, processed and stored the semen.
It is understood that
risk factors set forth in paragraph A-(A) , ( C ) , & (D) are greater
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks.
IS. We hereby covenant and agree, without reservation of
right, in law or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release
the doctor, the persons who are the donors of the semen, those
persons who collect, store, and/or preserve
and manipulate the
semen specimens, the University of Utah, the university of Utah
Hospital, the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology, the
Division of Urology, their officers, employees and agents from
any and all liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, in
any manner connected with or related to:
(A)

Complications of pregnancy;

<B)

Complications in any manner
birth and/or delivery;

(C)

Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any
birth defect, or of abnormalities of any kind,
including but
not
limited
to infections or
transmitted diseased through donor semen;

(D)

Genetic, hereditary
offspring;

(E)

Any other adverse consequences of any kind that
may arise or be connected directly or indirectly
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from
the artificial
insemination
and/or procedure(s)
herein authorized or contemplated.

traits or

connected with child

tendencies of such

13. We agree, individually and
severally, that neither of
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in
3

any way, any person,
including
initiating or pursuing any claim or
to any matter arising
out of, or
insemination procedure(s) authorized

any child
or offspring
in
legal proceeding with respect
resulting from the artificial
herein.

1^. We agree
and acknowledge
that
the procedures(s)
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical
services.
15. With the above considerations in mind, we, individually
and as husband and wife, hereby consent to, request and authorize
Dr.
\ V < "A
, who
is herein
referred
to as "our
doctor,"andsuchassistants
and associates as our doctor may
designate,
t/o undertake one or more artificial insemination
procedures
in an attempt
to achieve pregnancy
in the wife,
understanding and accepting all
the risks and responsibilities
attendant thereto.
16.
Confident iali tv.
We understand
that our doctor, the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology
and
the University of Utah, will
consider
the
information
developed about us during
this treatment
as confidential, and
that neither
our identity nor specific
medical details will be
revealed by any of them without
our prior
consent; however,
specific
medical
details may
be revealed
in professional
publications, but our
identify
is not
to be revealed.
We
understand
that
in the event an authorized government agency
reviews this or other documents, they may learn of our identity.
17. Procedures Authorized to Treat
Unforeseen Conditions.
We recognize
that during
the course of any of the procedures
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event
we authorize
and request our doctor, his assistants or his
designees, to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of
professional judgment necessary and desirable.
18. We acknowledge
that
the University
of
Utah, the
University
of
Utah School
of Medicine,
the Department
of
Obstetrics and
Gynecology,
the Division of Urology, and all
officers and
employees, including our doctor, are subject to the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Section 63-30.It et seq., U.C.A.
1953 as amended, which Act controls all
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability.
19. Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs. This Consent
Agreement shall be binding upon our administrators and heirs.

<+

20. Signatures.
We acknowledge by our signatures below
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction.
UNDERSIGNED:
Wife:
Date:

T-*y-^W r u 7 ^ ->(Cvo~w4ru vLX_
I <=< • V • • Q J U -- a r \

•5
Husband :
Date:

WITNESS:
)R PROVID]
SIGNATURE OF DOCTOR
PROVIDING
"JJDN:
THE ABOVE INFORMATJ
TV~]

Date:
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It couldn't hurt to read this:
It won't take that long. Don't throw it away.
And just so you don't get to the end of this and say, "you should have thought
about that." I know I should have. Believe me.
What I'd like you to think about is whether over the last year and a half, I've acted
like someone who wasn't happy with his life, and went out "looking" for someone else?
This is why I keep reminding you that she called me. (Yes, I know I should have hung
up.)
In the last year and a half, we've planned for a new house, vacations, babies,
furniture, drapes, you name it. We've talked about how to deal with the loss of your job,
Steph's problems in school, and on and. We've gone out more, camped more, and had
more fun than we had in five years put together.
This wasnot all some elaborate scheme to deceive you, it was how I really felt,
^and howlstill doTjThe reality of it is that everything really happened. It's all been true.
And then I screwed up.
Look at it all together, and put it in perspective. It was a moment of weakness vs
a year and a half or trying hard at happiness.
The alternative is ????. There's no way you're going to go to school full time,
because my income alone won't support two households. We might even be talking stuff
like whether S§££ can go to college or not. And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how
that's going to work. Think about it.
"
"
•
^
One of your few faults is that you're too tough. We've talked about it and its
probably from your childhood, but you feel that if you soften up and compromise a little,
you're being weak. (You were soft on Thursday night, and I think you had a better
handle on this whole thing then you've had since) Understanding and sympathy are not
weak. Don't be too tough for your own good.
Love,
Rick
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December 3, 1991

Attorney Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule
My File No. 400-11909-V
Dear Robert:
In connection with the above matter, my client has
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it.
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insemination so that the parties could have another child.
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a
child.
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and
she's going to obtain for me his written consent, the
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court
has acknowledged these types of agreements.
My client has indicated that if he will not put up
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up
any claim she has to alimony.
In addition, she indicated that she would allow
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer
vacation.
Please review this with your client, get back with me
-s

&
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge: Darwin Hanson

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submined by counsel and having heard argument from the
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial

LAW OFFICES
BANK 8UILDINC, SUrTE 200
VASRl.NCTON BOULEVARD
OCOEN, UTAH 14401
(801)395-2300
FAX ( M l ) 393-2340

determinations that have been raised by the parties in their pleadings.

2.

The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment

and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child
in question.
3.

The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child.

4.

In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means.

Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception.
5.

The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract

entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents.
6.

The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into

of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have
assume the full rights as natural parents.
7.

The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event

must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATESL A W OFFICES
*TY BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200 I
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN. UTAH W401
(801) J9J-2JOO
FAX (801) J9J-2J40

prior to the divorce being granted. Consequently, the contract was not terminated.

8.

The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a

minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to
repudiate the contract in this case.
9.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child,

Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992.
10.

The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the

natural parent of Matthew.
11.

The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

(

1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for

artificial insemination.
2.

The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this

case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child.
3.

The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce

4.

The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the

of the parties.

legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child.
5.
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200 I
' WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN. UTAH 14401
(MI)J9i-2JOO
FAX (801) J93-2J40

The court rules that the Plaintiff has the same legal responsibilities and rights

of a natural parent in regards to Matthew, born on March 24, 1992.

6.

The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an

evidentiary trial.
DATED t h i s ^ £ day of March, 1998.

DARWIN HANSON
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.

DATED this^C day of March, 1998.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
"V BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OCDEN, UTAH W401
<80I)J9*-U00
FAX (101)393.2340

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
documents), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden,UT 84401
DATED this k ^ d a y of March, 1998.

LEGAL ASSISTANT

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
°Y BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OCDEN, UTAfl 14401
(801) J93-2300
FAX(SOl)J9J-2J40

ADDENDUM 5

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge:"lXoU \\^„

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argumentfromthe
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

2.

The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24, 1992.

LAW OFFICES
KFV BANK BUILDINC. SUrTE 200

3.

/ASIUNCTON BOULEVARD

The remaining evidentiary issues shall be determined at a trial to be set by

OCOEN. UTAH W40I

(son jn-uoo

the court.

FAX<MI)J9*-2J40

r-
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>4&

DATED this^T^day of March, 1998.

HA:
District Court Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this J_ day of March, 1998.

L

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
K r v BANK BUILDING. SUITE 200
VASRINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN. UTAn 14401
(80l)J9J-2JO0
FAX(80I)J9J-2J40

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
documents), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden,UT 84401
DATED this

<A

ay of March, 1998.

^Sj=3J^

LEGAL ASSISTANT

ROBERT ECHARD
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OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
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^\ \ C A

\~27'°l*2-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

])

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff ,
vs.

'

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

)

Judge:

) Civil No.

U07W7J

WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating

and

agreeing at this time with respect to the issues raised by said
action, NOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the
parties hereto as follows, to-wit:
1.

That plaintiff may have his hearing

to obtain a

mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation
and Agreement.
2.

That defendant

is awarded

the care, custody and

control of the parties' minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date of
birth January 29, 1985.

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

3.
visitation

That

plaintiff

rights as utilized

shall
by

be

granetd

the Second

the

standard

Judicial

District

Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the
time stated above.
4.

That defendant shall maintain the parties1 minor

child on her health and accident
Base.

insurance with Hill Air Force

Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and

dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child
and

incorporate The Standard Medical Provisions adopted

above-entitled Court herein.

by the

The Standard Medical Provisions is

attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation.
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child
through his employment.
5.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving &
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS• KRAMBULE
Civil No, 910750473

$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base.
6.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony
shall

terminate

by

operation

of

law,

i.e.

cohabitation

or

remarr iage.
7.

That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the

day

care expense incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child

and

defendant shall provide written

documentation of the monthly child

care expense.
8.

Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant

may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is
pursuing
sophomore

a

bachelor's

degree.

Defendant

is

approximately

a

in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her

books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1,
1991.
9.

That the family home and real property located at 703

W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah
received

has been

sold and each party

has

one-half the net sales proceeds, and if there are any

additional payments received for payment of the reserve account,
each party shall also divide the same equally.
10.

That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home.
11.

That

retirement, his

defendant

interest

shall

in Alpine

be

awarded

Paving,

his

Inc., his

IRA, his
camping

equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net
sale proceeds from the sale of the home.
12.

The parties shall divide equally the joint account

at Shearson Leheman.
13.

That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before

January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc.
14.
household
neither

That

furniture

the
and

parties

have

furnishings

party makes any claim

and

equitably
personal

upon the other

for

divided

the

effects, and
any item of

personal property.
15.

That plaintiff

shall maintain

a life

insurance

policy in the sum of $50,000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at
least 18 years of age.
16.

That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties1

minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of

op*

STIPULATION
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computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a
dependent for tax purposes.

Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash

for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties1 child as a dependent
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax
information no later than February 28 of each year and plaintiff to
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his
election whether to claim the parties1 child as a dependent for tax
purposes.
17.

That each party shall pay their own attorney fees

and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings.
18.

That each party shall pay one-half of any non-

covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage
and

each

party

shall

be

responsible

to

pay

any

debts

and

obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation
on or about May 3, 1991.
19.

That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all

business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and
shall hold defendant harmless thereon.
20.

In the event defendant decides to move from the

immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to

STIPULATION
KR&MBULE VS.

KRAMBULE

Civil No. 910750473

relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving.
DATED this

](?

day of Q ^ w ^ j - y

, 199SL.

IICKY D. KfcAMBULE
Plaintiff

IT

L.

Attorney for Plaintiff

BARBARA R. KRAttBULE
Defendant

A-

N. VLAHi
Attorney for Defendant

v\
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IN THE SECC

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURf
STATE OF UTAH

F DAVIS COUNTY

COMMISSIONER'S VISITATION GUIDELINES
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may
agree. If they are not able to agree, reasonable/standard visitation
will routinely be defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten)
children as follows:
1. Alternate weekends:
Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m.
2.

Midweek:

Alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

3.

Holidays:
(A) CHRISTMAS - non-custodial parent to have
Christmas Day beginning at 1 p.m. and continuing through one-half
of the child's total Christmas school vacation.
(B) THANKSGIVING & EASTER - non-custodial parent
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 96, eta.J;
Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.
Non-custodial parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 9P
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.
(C) OTHER HOLIDAYS - New Year's Day, Martin Luther
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, and
Labor Day. These holidays are to be alternated, with the
non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday.
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and
no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend schedule.

4.

Father's Day/Mother's Day:
As appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 p.m.
the day of.

5.

Birthdays;
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the week
of the child's birthday and the non-custodial parent's birthday.

6.

Extended Visitation:
(A) SUMMER - Four weeks continuous, with written notice of
dates provided to custodial parent by May First. Custodial
parent to have alternate weekends, holiday, and phone
visitation.
(B) YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL - Two two-week periods, with wr.il»
notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 days prio;
visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday, and phone
visitation during this time.
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year
uninterrupted time with the children for purposes of vacation;
provided the same does not interfere with holiday visitation
per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing of
such two-week period at least 3 0 days in advance.

7.

Telephone: - Reasonable visitation before 8 p.m.

8.

Other times as agreed by the parties,

A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS

[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to
provide other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls.
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and
procedures for any and all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschological counseling, for which he
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie obligation to pay any non insurance
covered expense.
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the
court. The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees.
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay
and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then
each party will normally be ordered to pay one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or
procedures.
When the other parent is expected to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to
medical or dental expenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide
copies of all receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing
therefore incurrea. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be
primae facie deemea waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion of those payments, or
make arrangements to do so within 45 days of receipt of the documentation supporting required
parti cipat ion.
The party who has the health and accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit
of the family until such time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage
available to the spouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
. s

Commissioner, Weber)
County District Court
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced)
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COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY

vs.
Civil No.

910750473

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE

L Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of this mother
and father.
2a- Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income.
Refer to Instructions for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). *
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations
ordered for the children in this case).
2 d Optional: Enter the amountfromLine 12 of the Children in Present Home
Worksheet for either parent,
3- Subtract Linc2bf 2c, and 2dfrom2a- This is the Adjusted Mondily
Gross for child support purposes.
4. Take the COMBINED figure in line 3 and the number of children in line
1 to the Support Table. Fmd the Base Combined Support Obligation.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in line 3 by the COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parents share of
the Base Support Obligation.
7. Enter the children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance
premiums paid to insurance company,
8. Enter the raonthlywotk or training related child care expense for the
thechildren in Line L
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent.
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award
Subtract the Obligor's line 7fromline 9.
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child
Divide Line 10 by Line 1.
11 CHILD CARE AWARD
Multiply Line 8 by JO to obtain obligor's share of child care expense. Add to Line 10 only
when expense is actually incurred.

-o

